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Felipe León & Dan Zahavi 
 
Phenomenology of experiential sharing: The contribution of Schutz and Walther 
 
 
Abstract: The chapter explores the topic of experiential sharing by drawing on the early 
contributions of the phenomenologists Alfred Schutz (Schutz 1967 [1932]) and Gerda Walther 
(Walther 1923). It is argued that both Schutz and Walther support, from complementary 
perspectives, an approach to experiential sharing that has tended to be overlooked in current 
debates. This approach highlights specific experiential interrelations taking place among individuals 
who are jointly engaged and located in a common environment, and situates this type of sharing 
within a broader and richer spectrum of sharing phenomena. Whereas Schutz’ route to the sharing 
of experiences describes the latter as a pre-reflective interlocking of individual streams of 
experiences, arising from a reciprocal Thou-orientation, Walther provides a textured account of 
different types of sharing and correlated forms of communities.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although there is a widespread consensus in contemporary debates that the capacity to share 
intentions plays a pivotal role in the establishment of human forms of sociality (Tomasello et al. 
2005; Rakoczy 2008), it is still an open question what this sharing amounts to. Many agree that, 
when applied to intentions and other experiences, the talk of sharing isn’t merely metaphorical, and 
that it involves either something more than an aggregation of individual subjects’ experiences, or 
something altogether different from such an aggregation (for review see Tollefsen 2004; 
Schweikard and Schmid 2013). For instance, according to one influential approach, shared or 
collective intentions, although located in individual minds, are characterized by a sui generis 
psychological mode (Searle 1990, 1995; Gallotti and Frith 2013) 1. Other theorists have argued that 
shared intentions can be accounted for in terms of individuals’ intentions with the form ‘I intend’, 
characterized by a common propositional content and specific interrelations (Bratman 1999, 2014; 
Pacherie 2007), whereas a third family of prominent proposals have suggested that shared 
intentions ought to be attributed to collective or plural agents (Rovane 1998; Gilbert 1989; Pettit 
and List 2011). It has by now become customary to describe these approaches to collective 
intentions in terms of mode-, content- and subject- approaches (Schweikard and Schmid 2013) 
In spite of their differences, these groups of proposals tend to be underpinned by some common 
presuppositions. In the first place, they have usually focused on the sharing of intentions, since the 
latter are taken to play a crucial role for joint action. The rationale behind this preference seems to 
                                                          
1 In the analytic philosophical tradition, the expression “shared intention” was introduced by Bratman (cf. Gilbert 2014, 
97). Here it is used as neutral with respect to the different accounts. 
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be that, analogously to the way in which individual intentions are taken to be relevant for explaining 
individual actions, shared intentions are taken to be as relevant in accounting for joint actions. In 
recent years, however, there has been an increasing focus on the capacity that minded beings have 
for sharing other types of mental states, such as emotions (cf. von Scheve and Salmela 2014; 
Schmid 2009) and perceptual experiences (cf. Seemann 2012). Secondly, traditional approaches to 
the sharing of intentions have tended to overlook certain aspects of the cognitive, experiential and 
affective interrelations between individuals that might be of relevance if the latter are to share 
intentions and get involved in joint engagements. Think of the mutual recognition that potential 
collaborators in a joint activity might engage in; consider the sense of joint control that they often 
enjoy over a joint action in order to accomplish it successfully (Pacherie 2012, 2013; Tollefsen 
2014); or think of the sense of mutual trust that is often crucial if the jointness of an activity is not 
to be disrupted (cf. Seemann 2009; Schmid 2013).  
 These and other relational aspects of shared engagements are not usually highlighted in much 
of the theorizing about the sharing of experiences. This is clearly the case with Searle’s approach, 
which in spite of recognizing that collective intentions involve a “sense of us” (Searle 1990, 414), 
and of “doing something together” (Searle 1995, 24), allows for the possibility that a subject may 
have we-intentionality even in the absence of any other subject (Searle 1990, 407)2. And, apart from 
Searle’s, other influential approaches, such as Bratman’s (1999, 2014) and Gilbert’s (1989, 2014), 
even if sympathetic towards the idea that individuals must stand in actual and specific interrelations 
in order to share intentions, have mainly focused on the propositional (Bratman) and normative 
(Gilbert) dimensions of this relationality. Perhaps one might be sceptical from the outset about the 
relevance that relational and experience-based aspects, like the previously mentioned, may have in 
accounting for the sharing of intentions. But then again, one might also ask whether it is possible to 
obtain a proper understanding of what sharing actually amounts to if one neglects the experiential 
dimension and fails to analyse the very structure of a we-experience. As Tollefsen has recently 
argued, the complexity of joint agency seems to require taking into account both the personal and 
subpersonal levels of analysis (2014, 28). More in detail, she notes that “the qualitative aspects of 
doing things with others”, or as she also calls it, “the phenomenology of joint agency” has been for 
the most part overlooked in the literature (2014, 22), and goes on to defend the idea that “the 
experiential aspect of doings things with others plays a role in the control and monitoring of joint 
actions” (2014, 14). While Tollefsen readily acknowledges that her use of the term 
“phenomenology” does not refer to the philosophical tradition to which Husserl, Heidegger and 
others belonged (Tollefsen 2014, footnote 1), her comment is nevertheless suggestive. It is well 
known that classical phenomenology offers sophisticated analyses of intentionality. Might it also 
offer insights on the topic of collective intentionality and experiential sharing?  
 The contemporary debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy has spanned three 
decades, but questions concerning the structure of experiential sharing (broadly construed) and 
social reality have obviously been a long-standing concern in philosophy, and, as it happens, also in 
classical phenomenology (Scheler 1954 [1912], Schutz 1967 [1932], Walther 1923, Gurwitsch 2012 
[1931], Stein 2010a [1917], 2010b [1922], Husserl (1973, 1952), von Hildebrand (1975 [1930]).  
 In the following contribution, our main aim is to present some details of these partially 
forgotten resources by considering the early work of the phenomenologists Alfred Schutz (1899 – 
                                                          
2 For some critiques, see Schmid 2009, Pacherie 2007, Mejers 2003.  
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1959) and Gerda Walther (1897 – 1977). We will show that both Schutz and Walther developed, 
quite independently of each other, insightful analyses about the structure of experiential sharing. 
Furthermore, we will argue that some of their ideas can be brought together in an approach to 
sharing that highlights specific experiential interrelations taking place among individuals who are 
jointly engaged and located in a common environment. Given the richness and broad scope of 
Schutz’ and Walther’s analyses, we cannot here do full justice to their accounts. Rather, we will 
focus on Schutz’ account of what he terms the “we-relationship”, and on the elements of Walther’s 
proposal that enrich and clarify some of Schutz’ ideas. In particular, Walther’s distinction between 
types of communities and correlative forms of sharing will be discussed, as well as her notion of 
“communal experiencing” (Gemeinschaftserleben) that she distinguishes from related phenomena, 
such as empathy (Einfühlen) and sympathy (Mitfühlen). 
 Instead of following the chronological order of publication of Walther’s and Schutz’ 
contributions (Walther’s doctoral dissertation Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der sozialen 
Gemeinschaften was published almost ten years before Schutz’ dissertation), we will start with the 
latter. The reason for this is that, as we will see, Schutz’ analysis of the social world explores some 
of the ground that is presupposed in Walther’s account. 
 
2. Alfred Schutz 
 
In his 1932 dissertation Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende 
Soziologie, Alfred Schutz faults Weber for failing to offer a proper account of the constitution of 
social meaning, and more generally for being too uninterested in more fundamental questions in 
epistemology and theory of meaning. It is this lacuna that Schutz then seeks to overcome by 
combining Weber’s interpretive sociology with reflections drawn from Husserl’s phenomenology. 
According to Schutz, one of the more specific shortcomings of Weber’s theory is that it fails to 
acknowledge the heterogeneity of the social world. As Schutz writes, “Far from being 
homogeneous, the social world is structured in a complex way, and the other subject is given to the 
social agent (and each of them to an external observer) in different degrees of anonymity, 
experiential immediacy, and fulfilment.” (1967, 8. Modified translation)3. In the fourth and central 
part of the book (1967, 14), Schutz proceeds to distinguish four different spheres within the social 
world: the sphere of the “directly experienced social reality” (1967, 142) (soziale Umwelt), the 
“social world of contemporaries” (1967, 142) (soziale Mitwelt), the “social world of predecessors” 
(1967, 143) (soziale Vorwelt) and the “social world of successors” [soziale Folgewelt] (1967, 143).  
The realm of directly experienced social reality, or to put it differently, the social surrounding 
world, is the one in which the social world is open for direct experience, and within which others 
are presented as fellow men (Mitmenschen). It would be wrong, however, to restrict the social 
reality that a subject has experience of to this social dimension. According to Schutz, we must 
recognize that there is also a social world of contemporaries (Nebenmenschen), that coexists with 
the subject and is simultaneous with his duration, although the lack of spatial proximity prevents 
other subjects’ experiences from being grasped as originally and directly as is possible in the social 
surrounding world. Furthermore, a subject can also be directed to a world of predecessors 
                                                          
3 The English translations of passages from Schutz’ book have throughout been modified where necessary, in order to 
provide a more accurate rendering of the original. 
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(Vorfahren), that existed at some point but does not exist anymore, and to a forthcoming world of 
successors (Nachfahren), that can be apprehended only in a vague and indeterminate manner.  
 According to Schutz, the face-to-face encounter characteristic of the social surrounding world 
provides for the most fundamental type of interpersonal understanding (Schutz 1967, 162). It is at 
the basis of what he terms the “we-relationship” or “living social relationship”, which is the central 
concept in his account of experiential sharing. In consonance with a view to be found in other 
classical phenomenologists (Stein 2010a [1917], Scheler 1954 [1912], Merleau-Ponty 2002 [1945]), 
and which has seen a revival in recent years (Zahavi 2011, Gallagher 2008, Smith 2010, Krueger 
2012, León 2013), he endorses the idea that the experience of the bodily mindedness of others is 
prior to and more fundamental than any understanding of others that draws on imaginative 
projection, memory or theoretical knowledge (1967, 101). We only start to employ the latter 
strategies when we are already convinced that we are facing minded creatures, but are simply 
unsure about precisely how we are to interpret the expressive phenomena in question. To that 
extent, there is a level at which the other is given as “unquestionable [fraglos]” (1967, 140). By this 
Schutz does not mean that we have an infallible access to another subject’s experiences, but rather 
that any kind of doubting, theoretical reasoning, etc. about the latter presupposes that they are given 
in the first place to us. In the context of the social surrounding world, other subjects are given on the 
basis of what Schutz calls the “Thou-orientation” (Du-Einstellung), that is, “the intentionality of 
those acts whereby the Ego grasps the existence [Dasein] of the other person in the mode of the 
original self” (1967, 164, cf. Zahavi 2015). Along similar lines, Schutz allows for a “genuine 
understanding of the other person [echtes Fremdverstehen]” (1967, 111), where our intentional act 
is directed not at the observed body, “but through its medium to the foreign experiences 
themselves” (1967, 111. Modified translation). 
One requirement that must be in place in order to allow for such a genuine understanding is that 
the perceiving and the perceived subject’s streams of consciousness are “simultaneous” or “co-
existent” (1967, 102) Drawing on ideas found in Bergson (1967, 103), Schutz argues that “whereas 
I can observe my own lived experiences only after they are over and done with, I can observe yours 
as they actually take place. This in turn implies that you and I are in a specific sense 
“simultaneous”, that we “coexist”, that our respective streams of consciousness intersect” (1967, 
102). What is at stake here is more than a mere objective simultaneity. Indeed, Schutz argues that if 
we take seriously the idea that we have a direct access to other people’s experiences, and that this 
direct access is grounded on the simultaneity of the streams of consciousness, we should deny that 
the epistemic asymmetry between the first-person and the second-person perspective entails that the 
access I have to your experience is somehow secondary or parasitic when compared to the access 
you have to your own experience. Actually, and quite to the contrary, if we follow Schutz’ analysis, 
my perspective on you and your experiences is to some extent privileged in that I can be 
thematically aware of the latter as they unfold pre-reflectively, whereas you cannot be thematically 
aware of your own experiences prior to reflecting upon them (1967, 102, 169). 
How are these ideas concerning the possibility of a direct perception of other subjects, of the 
simultaneity of the streams of consciousness, and of the distinctiveness of the second-personal 
access related to the Schutz’ notion of the we-relationship? According to him, the Thou-orientation 
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can in principle be one-sided (1967, 146), that is, it doesn’t need reciprocation or communication4. 
However, when two (or more) individuals engage in a reciprocal Thou-orientation, i.e., when each – 
in the face-to-face relationship - relates to the other as a you, we have what Schutz calls a “we-
relationship” or, as he also calls it, a “living social relationship”:  
 
I take up an Other-orientation toward my partner, who is in turn oriented toward me. 
Immediately, and at the same time, I grasp the fact that he, on his part, is aware of my 
attention to him. In such cases I, you, we, live in the social relationship itself, and that is true 
in virtue of the intentionality of the living Acts directed toward the partner.  I, you, we, are by 
this means carried from one moment to the next in a particular attentional modification of the 
state of being mutually oriented to each other. The social relationship in which we live is 
constituted, therefore, by means of the attentional modification undergone by my Other-
orientation, as I immediately and directly grasp within the latter the very living reality of the 
partner as one who is in turn oriented toward me. We will call such a social relationship a 
‘living social relationship’. (Schutz 1967, 156-157) 
 
The living social relationship or we-relationship allows for different levels of concretisation 
(Konkretisationsstufe). For example, the richness of a face-to face conversation with an old friend 
obviously differs from simply apprehending a stranger as a minded being, with no concern for his 
or her specific experiences. As a limiting case, Schutz even refers to a “pure we-relationship” 
(1967, 164), characterized by an apprehension of the other’s Dasein, of his bare presence, rather 
than of his Sosein, that is, of his being in a certain determinate manner (1967, 164). Furthermore, 
the experiential immediacy (Erlebnisunmittelbarkeit) of a we-relationship can vary along a 
spectrum in its intensity and intimacy (1967, 168, 176). A conversation, for instance, can be 
animated or offhand, eager or casual, superficial or quite personal, and so forth (1967, 168)  
A crucial element in Schutz’ account of the social relationship in the surrounding world is that 
the distinctiveness of the latter is constituted in the first place by an “interlocking” of perspectives. 
As he puts it, “This interlocking [Ineinandergreifen] of glances, this thousand-faceted mirroring of 
each other constitutes in the first place [überhaupt erst] the peculiarity of the social relationship in 
the surrounding world” (1967, 170. Modified translation). Although Schutz emphasizes the 
reciprocal and interlocking character of the we-relationship, it is however important to get clearer 
on what precisely this “interlocking” really amounts to. Importantly, the we-relationship doesn’t 
come about as a result of a mere summation and alternation of your and my Thou-orientations, 
rather it involves something new. In being directed to your experiences, I apprehend them in a 
manner which is in principle foreclosed to you, and, since, at the same time, you are aware of my 
apprehension of your experiential life, your experiences are modified in a certain way (1967, 171). 
However, in order for the idea of interlocking to gain sufficient weight, the modification at stake 
cannot be incidental, but must be constitutive of the interlocking character of the we-relationship. 
Were your experiences not modulated by my apprehension of them and vice-versa, we could each 
have them in the absence of any joint engagement. This is why Schutz insists that as a result of 
living in such a we-relationship, we affect each other immediately (1967, 167). 
                                                          
4 The fact that Schutz allows for a one-sided Thou-orientation is surprising and must ultimately be considered a mistake 
(cf. Carr 1987, Zahavi 2014). For a more extensive discussion of the significance of reciprocal Thou-orientation and 
second-person perspective taking see Zahavi 2015.  
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Schutz occasionally writes that the singular reflections (Spiegelungen) from the I to the Thou, 
and vice versa, are not differentiated, but apprehended as a unity in the we (1967, 170): 
 
Within the unity of this experience [the We-experience] I can be aware simultaneously of the 
experiences of my own consciousness and of the series of experiences in your consciousness, 
living through the two series of experiences as one series, that of the common We” (Schutz 
1967, 170. Modified translation).  
 
Although he even writes that we are then “living in our common stream of consciousness” (1967, 
167), one must be cautious not to be mislead by this and similar statements. In fact, rather than 
entailing a fusion that destroys individuality ,the suggestion here is that our respective streams of 
consciousness are interlocked to such an extent that each of our respective experiences are colored 
by our mutual involvement (1967, 167, 180). Had there been any kind of true fusion, the focus on 
the you constitutive of the we-relationship would be dissolved. Furthermore, as Schutz emphasizes, 
the temporal closeness between you and me, within the we, goes hand in hand with spatial 
proximity but discontinuity (1967, 166). 
Schutz insists that the we-relationship and the interlocking of perspectives is primarily pre-
reflective and lived through. By this he means that if, while participating in a we-relationship, one 
tries to thematically observe or reflect on the latter, one will thereby disrupt and withdraw from it. 
As he writes, “To the extent that we are going to think about the experiences we have together, we 
must to that degree withdraw from each other. If we are to bring the We-relationship into the focus 
of our attention, we must stop focusing on each other. But that means stepping out of the social 
relationship in the surrounding world, because only in the latter do we live in the We.” (1967, 167. 
Modified translation) The greater my reflective awareness of the we-relationship, the less am I 
involved in it, and the less am I genuinely related to my partner as a co-subject (1967, 167).  
Until now, some of the crucial elements of Schutz’s analysis of the we-relationship have been 
highlighted: direct perception of others, co-existence of streams of consciousness, second-person 
authority, reciprocity, and pre-reflective character. Of these conditions, the recognition of the 
distinctiveness of the second-personal access complements the idea of direct perception when the 
latter is understood as reciprocal. At the same time, we have suggested that the second-person 
authority sustains the specific pre-reflective interlocking of experiences that, according to Schutz, 
marks the distinctive character of the we-relationship. But would these preconditions be sufficient 
for the constitution of a we? Think of a situation where two people are having an argument and end 
up insulting each other. Even though the case may be constructed such that all of the 
aforementioned conditions are met, one might nevertheless have reservations about describing the 
situation as one involving a shared we-experience. Part of the problem might be due to the fact that 
Schutz’ paradigmatic example of a reciprocal thou-orientation, namely the “face-to-face” situation, 
is precisely a situation where two individuals confront each other; it is in other words, an inherently 
confrontational situation. Curiously enough, however, when Schutz wants to illustrate the reciprocal 
(wechselseitig) character of the thou-orientation, as it happens in the we-relationship, he departs 
from his standard case and mentions an example where the focus is not on the you, but rather on the 
world:  
 
 7 
Suppose that you and I are watching a bird in flight. […] Nevertheless, during the flight of the 
bird you and I have “grown older together”; our experiences have been simultaneous. Perhaps 
while I was following the bird’s flight I noticed out of the corner of my eye that your head was 
moving in the same direction as mine. I could then say that the two of us, that we, had watched 
the bird’s flight. What I have done in this case is to coordinate temporally a series of my own 
experiences with a series of yours (Schutz 1967, 165) 
 
In the case of experiential sharing, the experience is no longer simply experienced by me as 
mine, but as ours. That is why it makes perfect sense to articulate the experience in question with 
the use of the first-person plural. One interesting feature about Schutz’ example, however, is that 
the moment of sharing doesn’t arise when one subject is directed to the other, and vice-versa, but 
rather when both of them are jointly directed at an object in the world. Of course, one might well 
think that the face-to-face encounter is a precondition for focusing on a common object, and that a 
focus on the other subject and on the common object may alternate as a specific perceptual situation 
unfolds. Nevertheless, and in spite of Schutz’ occasional indications to the contrary, it seems that 
the face-to-face encounter isn’t yet sufficient in order to achieve the desired reciprocity, rather what 
is also needed is a kind of coordination that is sustained by a common focus on an external object or 
project in the world (Carr 1987, 271). 
It might here be important to insist upon the difference between being-for-one-another 
(Füreinandersein) and being-with-one-another (Miteinandersein). Whereas the you-me relation can 
be dyadic, the we often involves a triadic structure, where the focus is on a shared object or project. 
Not only can there be cases of intense you-me interactions, such as strong verbal disagreements or 
arguments, where there is not yet (or no longer) a we present but, even in more conciliatory 
situations, paying too much attention to the other might disrupt the shared perspective. The couple 
who is enjoying the movie together can serve as a good illustration of this. Their focus of attention 
is on the movie and not on each other. However, this is not to say that emotional sharing is 
independent of and precedes any second-person awareness of the other. We shouldn’t make the 
mistake of equating consciousness with thematic or focal consciousness. After all, I can remain 
aware of my partner, even if I am not thematically aware of her, and it is hard to make sense of the 
notion of shared experiences, if other-awareness in any form whatsoever is entirely absent. 
At this point, it will be useful to consider different types of interlocking systems that may come 
about as a result of different common foci. Gerda Walther’s investigation of the ontology of social 
communities proves useful to locate the reciprocal Thou-orientation investigated by Schutz within a 
broader and more textured account of experiential sharing. After all, there might well be shared 
experiences which are not we-experiences in Schutz’ sense.   
 
3. Gerda Walther 
In her 1919 dissertation Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften (1923) Walther 
offers a far more detailed analysis of we-intentionality than the one found in Schutz. Her analysis of 
experiential sharing is in particular situated within a more overarching investigation of the ontology 
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of social communities. 5  Since Walther concedes that she in dealing with this latter topic is 
presupposing an account of how we come to know foreign subjectivities (1923, 17), one might also 
say that Walther’s investigation to some extent presupposes some of the ground that Schutz were 
later to cover in his analysis of the Thou-orientation.6 
Walther starts out by pointing to the insufficiencies of some standard accounts of communal 
life. A social community is distinguished by the fact that its members have something in common, 
there is something that they share (1923, 19). However, for a number of individuals to constitute a 
social community, it is not enough that they simply have the same kind of intentional state and are 
directed to the same kind of object. Such a match could obtain in situations where the individuals 
had no awareness or knowledge of each other. And that would be insufficient. What must also be 
required is some knowledge that the individuals have of each other. Moreover, the knowledge has 
to be of a special kind. Assume that A, B, and C are three scientists living in three different 
countries who are all working on the same scientific problem. The mere fact that each of the 
scientists knows about the existence of the other two would not as such make them into a 
community (1923, 20). But what if they interacted with one another? As Walther observes, such a 
reciprocal interaction, where each individual influences the intentional life of the other definitely 
brings us closer to what we are after. However, something would still be missing. Consider the case 
of a group of workers who are brought together to finish a construction, and who interact in order to 
obtain the same goal. To some extent they work together, but they might still consider each other 
with suspicion or at best with indifference (1923, 31). Seen from without, they might be 
indistinguishable from a communal group, but they only form a society (Gesellschaft) and not a 
community (Gemeinschaft). For the latter to obtain, something more is needed. What is missing in 
the two latter cases is the presence of an inner bond or connection (innere Verbundenheit), a feeling 
of togetherness (Gefühl der Zusammengehörigkeit). It is only when the latter is present, that a social 
formation becomes a community (1923, 33). As Walther writes,  
 
We are standing here on the same ground of those theorists […] that consider the essential 
element of the community to be a ‘feeling of togetherness’, or an inner unification [innere 
Einigung]. Every social configuration that exhibits such an inner unification, and only those 
configurations are, in our opinion, communities. Only in communities can one strictly speak 
about communal experiences, actions, goals, aspirations, desires, etc. (in contrast to experiences, 
actions, etc. that may be the same or similar, and that can be present in societal relations 
[gesellschaftlichen Verbindungen]). However, not every social relation exhibits such a feeling of 
togetherness, such an inner bond. (Walther 1923, 33. Emphasis in the original). 
To enjoy a we-experience, say, a shared feeling of joy, is to experience the other as participating 
with me in that experience. Thus, the joy is no longer simply experienced by me as mine, but as 
ours, we are experiencing it. The we in question is, however, not something that is behind, above or 
                                                          
5 As we have already said, a full analysis of the book falls beyond the scope of this contribution. Walther’s work is still 
fairly unknown (but see Caminada 2014, Schmid 2009, 2012). 
6 Walther makes reference here, amongst others, to Husserl, who is also one of the key sources of Schutz’ dissertation, 
in particular of the latter’s concept of Du-Einstellung (cf. Schutz 1967, 101). As for the topic of Einfühlung, Walther 
refers to Stein’s Zum Problem der Einfühlung, and to the Anhang of Scheler’s Phänomenologie der Sympathiegefühle 
(later incorporated into his Wesen und Formen der Sympathie as the last section of the last part of the book. Cf. 
Schlossberger 2005, 148). 
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independent of the participating individuals (1923, 70). The we is not an experiencing subject in its 
own right. Rather the we-experiences occur and are realized in and through the participating 
individuals (1923, 70). The latter consequently come to have experiences they would not have had, 
were it not for the fact that they stand in certain relations to others. But again how does this happen? 
It is not as if I first as an isolated individual have individual experiences that I then compare with 
the individual experiences of others, and which I then, if I think they experience the same as I, unite 
myself with in order to grasp the experiences as communal experiences. Such processes might 
indeed occur prior to the establishing of communal experiences, but they are not themselves true 
communal experiences. True communal experiences are experiences which on the basis of a prior 
unification emerge from us, from the others in me, and from me in the others (1923, 72). Consider 
as an example a situation where two individuals are admiring a beautiful vista. The other individual 
expresses his admiration and I grasp his admiration empathically. At this stage, the admiration is 
given as foreign and not as own. I might also personally admire the view. But even so, his 
admiration is given to me as his own, and therefore not as ours. At some point, however, the 
situation might change and we might come to enjoy the vista together. Although I do not see the 
vista through his eyes, his admiration of the vista becomes part of my experience of it (and vice-
versa). Thus, each of us comes to have a complex experience that integrates and encompasses 
several perspectives at once. According to Walther, this peculiar belonging-to-me of the other’s 
experience is what is distinctive and unique about we-experiences (1923, 75).   
In her analysis, Walther carefully distinguishes communal experiences, or experiential 
sharing, from empathy, imitation (and emotional contagion) and sympathy. In the first place, to 
grasp the experiences of the other empathically is quite different from sharing his experiences. In 
empathy, I grasp the other’s experiences insofar as they are expressed in words, gestures, body 
posture, facial expressions etc. Throughout I am aware that I am not myself the one who originarily 
lives through these experiences, but that they belong to the other, that they are the other’s 
experiences, and that they are only given to me qua expressive phenomena (1923, 73). Even if we 
by coincidence had the same kind of experiences, this would not amount to a we-experience. 
Despite the similarity of the two experiences, they would not been unified in the requisite manner, 
but would simply stand side by side as belonging to distinct individuals (1923, 74). Secondly, we 
also need to distinguish experiential and emotional sharing from imitation or contagion. In the latter 
case, I might take over the experience of somebody else and come to experience it as my own. But 
insofar as that happens, and insofar as I then no longer have any awareness of the other’s 
involvement, it has nothing to do with shared experiences. The latter consequently requires a 
preservation of plurality. Finally, to feel sympathy for somebody, to be happy because he is happy 
or sad because he is sad also differs from being happy or sad together with the other (1923, 76-77). 
It is only when the subject experiences that the experience which is there in the other also belongs 
to itself that we have a true communal experience (1923, 78). In the true communal experience it is 
as if a ray departs from my own experiential life and becomes interwoven with the experiential life 
of the other (1923, 79). 
What exactly does Walther have in mind when she refers to this inner bond, this feeling of 
togetherness? She claims that it amounts to more than simply some kind of reciprocal influence that 
subjects have on each other (Wechselwirkung), and instead seeks to explain it in terms of a certain 
reciprocal unification (Wechseleinigung) (1923, 63), intrinsically characterized by its affective 
character. The feeling of togetherness is precisely a feeling, and not a judgment or an act of 
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cognition, although the former can certainly give rise to the latter (1923, 34). Walther next 
distinguishes different types of unification ranging from an actual and voluntary unification to a 
broader and more habitual unification. Although the latter presupposes the former, its relevance is 
nevertheless highlighted by Walther who writes that “the habitual unifications are almost more 
important for the foundation of communities and of the communal life than the actual unifications, 
that dissolve quickly” (1923, 48), and that “the habitual unification is what, in the first place, must 
found and underpin [untergrundieren] the whole communal life” (1923, 69). This emphasis on 
habitual unification is not meant to undermine the importance of our direct awareness of and 
interaction with others, rather it goes hand in hand with her distinction between we-experiences in 
the narrow sense of the term – which require spatial proximity and temporal simultaneity (1923, 66, 
68) – and communal experiences. People can experience themselves as members of a community, 
can identify with other members of the same community, and can have group experiences even if 
they do not live temporally and spatially together, i.e., even if – to use some terms from Schutz – 
they are not fellow men or contemporaries. Some communities, which Walther calls “personal 
communities”, come about because different individuals directly bond with each other. In other 
cases, however, the bond between individuals is mediated by a relation to specific objects (be it 
objects of art, religious associations, territories, rituals, scientific methods, social institutions etc.). 
As a result of being bonded with these objects, the individuals might then also feel unified with 
other people who likewise are attached to the same kind of objects, even if they have never met 
them in person (1923, 49-50). Walther refers to the latter form of communities as “objectual 
communities”. The more the unification of the members is conditioned by the unification with 
external objects (rather than bound to direct interpersonal interaction) the more the knowledge that 
the different members have of each other can be indirect, and the greater their spatio-temporal 
separation can be (1923, 82).  
Consequently, Walther emphasizes that not every unification is dependent upon the subject 
first having empathically encountered other subjects with similar experiences. However, the merely 
presumed presence of similar content and the merely presumed presence of other humans with 
whom one is unified, but of whom one doesn’t know anything, does not yet amount to a real 
community (1923, 81). To have a real and fully constituted community it is important that the 
fulfilment of the intention that is directed at other human beings is brought about by direct or 
indirect (depending on the kind of community) real experience, where the different members are 
standing in reciprocal relationships to one another (1923, 82). The relational element is preserved, 
even in those cases where subjects do not have a direct access to each other. 
Insofar as a community is institutionalized and organized around specific external objects, 
the concrete interaction between the members of the community is of less importance for the 
maintenance of the community. In those cases, by contrast, where the community is primarily 
interpersonal in question, the reciprocal interaction is much more important (and the focus on 
external objects might primarily be a means to an end, namely that of being together) (1923, 91-93). 
In the former case, the members are also far more replaceable than in the latter. Some communities, 
like friendships, families and marriages, are not regulated by a shared external object or goal. They 
are unified without pursuing common goals, but even in these cases, the communal life is 
penetrated by a shared meaning or goal, although the goal, instead of being external, is the 
flourishing of the community itself. Walther calls these forms of communities “reflexive 
communities” (1923, 67).  
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Coming back to the we-experience in the narrow sense of the term, the fact that it involves a 
certain unification or integration does not entail that it has no internal complexity. According to 
Walther, the following moments must be distinguished: 1) the experience of A is directed at an 
object, 1a) the experience of B is directed in a similar way as A at the same object. 2) At the same 
time, A empathically grasps the experience of B, 2a) just as B empathically grasps the initial 
experience of A. 3) A’s unification (Einigung) with the empathically grasped experience of B, and 
3a) B’s unification with the empathically grasped experience of A. 4) Finally, A empathically 
grasps B’s unification with A’s experience, 4a) just as B empathically grasps A’s unification with 
B’s experience (1923, 85).7 As the following diagram, which is Walther’s own (1923, 86), can 
illustrate, one might even talk of a certain web of intentionality:   
 
 
A   
 3 2 1 
      4 
 
      4a 
2a 
 3a  1a 
B 
  
It is important to note that the different components of the we-experience distinguished by Walther 
are characterized as moments of an experience that is “entirely lived through as a unit” (1923, 85). 
However, despite this, one might still wonder whether Walther’s account does not given rise to an 
infinite regress. Prima facie, it is not clear why the account stops at 4a. In order for the we-
experience to take place, wouldn’t it be necessary to also include a moment 5, in which A would be 
empathically directed at B’s empathic awareness of A’s identification with B’s experience (and a 
corresponding moment 5a)?8 And if so, wouldn’t it also be necessary to include a moment 6, and so 
forth? This objection can not only serve to highlight some of the distinctive elements of Walther’s 
proposal, but also pinpoint one limitation of it. The infinite regress objection relies on the 
possibility of empathically apprehending empathic experiences; to put it differently, it relies on the 
possibility of iterative empathy. Since Walther acknowledges that A’s and B’s respective 
experiences described in 4 and 4a are partially founded upon iterative empathy (1923, 85. Cf. Stein 
2010a, 30), it is surprising that she doesn’t consider the difficulty her own account runs into, were 
                                                          
7 A somewhat similar account can also be found in Husserl. Consider for instance the following quote from 1922: “An 
act, in which an I is directed to another, is founded first of all on the following: I1 empathically apprehends I2, and vice-
versa, but not only this. I1 experiences (understands) I2 as understandingly experiencing [verstehend Erfahrenden], and 
vice-versa. I see the other as an other that sees me and understands me. Furthermore, I ‘know’ that the other also knows 
that he is seen by me. We understand each other, and in the mutual understanding we are spiritually together, in 
contact” (Husserl 1973, 211).  
 
8 As Schweikard and Schmid put it, “How could there be a shared experience between A and B if A is unaware of the 
fact that B is empathetically aware of A's identification with B's experience, or some such?” (Schweikard and Schmid 
2013. For discussion, cf. Schmid 2012, 132 ff.). 
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the empathic acts to be performed ad infinitum.  
But perhaps the actual performance of such empathic acts is not something that is required 
by her account. To put it differently, one way out of the difficulty might be to emphasize that, even 
if the performance of such acts of iterative empathy remains a possibility for A and B, such higher-
order iterations are not needed in order for the we-experience to take place. Rather, what is 
important is that each subject is aware of the unification described in 3/3a, which is something that 
would already happen in 4/4a. On this reading of Walther’s proposal, the regress would be stopped 
by noting that the we-experience involves a distinctive affective component, and that this 
component, together with  each subject’s awareness of the latter would be sufficient for basic 
sharing (A and B must each be aware of the affective bond described in 3/3a). This interpretation is 
consistent with Walther’s emphasis on empathy and unification, and with her resistance to any 
attempt to explain sharing on the basis of explicit acts of knowledge or judgements (1923, 34).  
Still, the infinite regress objection does highlight what appears to be a limitation of Walther’s 
account. Walther’s diagram suggests that the empathic apprehensions going on at 2/2a and 4/4a are 
of the same kind, namely thematic and focal. However, this need not be the case. While 
paradigmatic cases of empathy are focal and explicit, there are also forms of other-awareness that 
are less salient and objectifying, and which might precisely be found in we-experiences of the kind 
explored by Walther. As remarked in the previous section, in those cases in which a we-relationship 
involves a triadic structure, paying too much attention to the other person might disrupt the shared 
perspective. This echoes Schutz’ idea that the we-experience is primarily pre-reflective and lived 
through, an idea that Walther seems to agree with. As she writes, in spite of the fact that the we-
experience has a complex structure, each subject need not be intentionally directed to that structure 
as an object of experience. Instead, what might be involved is “a distinctive, immediate Innesein in 
the background of consciousness, an empathic and identifying living in-the-other and with-one-
another [ein eigenartiges, unmittelbares Innesein im Bewusstseinshintegrund, (…) ein einfühlend-
geeignigtes In- und Miteinander-leben]” (1923, 85). In such a context, a thematic awareness of the 
other could involve a disruption of the we-experience and of the affective bonding delivered by the 
unification. This should also make it clear why it would be problematic to include further 
hierarchies of empathy in the account.  
  
4. Conclusion 
Schutz’ analysis of the we-relationship provides an account of one type of experiential sharing 
characterized by the spatio-temporal proximity of the involved individuals. According to him, the 
distinctive character of the we-relationship is marked by a pre-reflective interlocking of individual 
streams of experiences, arising from a reciprocal Thou-orientation. The latter is dependent upon the 
possibility of directly perceiving the other subject’s embodied mindedness, and on the distinctive 
character of the second-personal access to the subjective life of others. Walther concurs with Schutz 
in recognizing the importance of the we-relationship, but she locates the latter within the broader 
notion of communal experiences. At the core of the latter there is an affective unification, or feeling 
of togetherness, that can occur even if individuals don’t live spatially and temporally together. The 
more the unification of the members is conditioned by the unification with external objects, as is the 
case in Walther’s “objectual communities”, the more the knowledge that the different members 
have of each other can be indirect, and the greater their spatio-temporal separation can be.  
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There are several aspects of Schutz’ and Walther’s proposals that we have not been able to 
address, and that would merit further consideration. Despite this, however, it should be abundantly 
clear that both Walther and Schutz in their respective accounts of experiential sharing highlight the 
importance of a topic we started out with, namely relationality. On both account, a preservation of 
the self-other differentiation is a precondition for experiential sharing and we-intentionality. 
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